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UNIVERSITY OPPOSITION TO
UNFETTERED RESEARCH:
A NEW BEDFELLOW FOR BIOTECH?
Katherine L. Record†
ABSTRACT
This Article examines university opposition to a proposed statutory exemption to infringement liability for basic genetic research and
patient care. Gene patenting has allowed patentees to bar basic genetic research, slowing the progress of developing and administering
diagnostics and gene-targeting therapeutics. Debates over the merits
of gene patents have been heated, most recently leading to an unprecedented invalidation of several broad patents covering all variations and use of two genes linked to breast and ovarian cancers. More
important, however (as this ruling was reversed in part), are proposed
statutory exemptions to infringement liability. The Department of
Health and Human Services’ Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) has promulgated an exemption
from liability for infringement that occurs in the course of research.
This exemption would promote basic research by granting academic
scientists unfettered access to genetic material. The proposal does not
alter the patentability of gene sequences; it merely restricts patentees
from using infringement threats to stop research.
Surprisingly, the Association of University Technology Managers
(AUTM), an organization responsible for promoting development of
university research, opposes such an exemption. The AUTM alleges
that the exemption would slow research by reducing the incentive for
private firms to invest in upstream discoveries made in university
laboratories. Yet the exemption would do the opposite: by opening
the doors to research relating to any gene segment, a research exemption would accelerate basic research. Moreover, it would not affect
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collaboration with private industry: where there is potential to commercialize basic research, biomedical companies would continue to
license the rights to university discoveries. Thus, the AUTM’s motivations in opposing the proposed research exemption are suspect.
They appear to reflect either a misunderstanding of the purpose behind granting property rights to publicly funded university research, or
an improper alignment with industry goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Our genetic makeup is far too complicated for a single entity to
hold the keys to any given gene and to be able to choose when, if ever,
to share.1
Gene patenting has created great controversy since its inception
only two decades ago. Exclusive rights over strands of nucleotides
allow patentees to bar basic research on small but critically important
sequences of the genome, creating logjams in genetic research and
1
Joseph Stiglitz & John Sulston, The Case Against Gene Patents, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 16, 2010, at A19.
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slowing the progress of developing and administering diagnostics and
gene-targeting therapeutics. Debates over the merits of gene patents
have been heated, most recently illustrated by an unprecedented invalidation of several broad patents covering all variations and use of
two genes linked to breast and ovarian cancers.2 Although this ruling
was reversed in part, it, along with the dissenting opinion to its reversal, demonstrates clear judicial recognition that the problems associated with gene patenting merit serious attention.
Fortunately, given the volatility in judicial treatment of gene patents,3 reducing the barriers to research and clinical care does not require judicial invalidation of gene patents. Rather, statutory exemptions to infringement liability can, and have, ameliorated problematic
uses of patent enforcement power. A recent proposal, put forth by the
Department of Health and Human Services’ Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS), puts forth an
exemption from liability for infringement that occurs in the course of
research.4 This exemption would promote basic research by granting
academic scientists unfettered access to genetic material. The proposal does not alter the patentability of gene sequences; it merely restricts patentees from using infringement threats to stop research.
Surprisingly, the Association of University Technology Managers
(AUTM), an organization responsible for promoting the commercialization of basic research, opposes such an exemption. The AUTM
alleges that the exemption would slow research by reducing the incentive for private firms to invest in upstream discoveries made in university laboratories. Yet the exemption would do the opposite: by
opening the doors to research relating to any gene segment, a research
exemption would accelerate basic research. Moreover, it would not
affect collaboration with private industry: where there is potential to
commercialize basic research, biomedical companies will continue to
license the rights to university discoveries. Thus, the AUTM’s moti2
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
3
Compare id. (reasoning that the USPTO’s treatment of isolated DNA as
patentable subject matter reflects nothing more than a “lawyers trick”) with Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), No. 2010-1406, 2011 WL 3211513, at
*6-8 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (concluding that isolated DNA has a “distinctive
chemical identity and nature” and is thus appropriately patent eligible subject matter)
and id. at *75-76, *117-18 (reasoning that isolated DNA is “not materially different
from … native genes” and thus “analogous to the ‘new mineral discovered in the
earth,’ or the ‘new plant found in the wild’”) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
4
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV’S, GENE PATENTS & LICENSING PRACTICES & THEIR IMPACT
ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 4 (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS Report].
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vations in opposing the proposed research exemption are suspect.
They appear to reflect either a misunderstanding of the purpose behind granting property rights to publicly funded university research,5
or an improper alignment with industry goals.
This article examines the challenges gene patenting has presented
for basic research, the proposed exemption that seeks to ameliorate
them, and the AUTM’s unfounded objection to this proposal. Part I
discusses why patents on gene sequences are unique, both in substance and source. The patentability of nucleotides and the fruits of
university research are relatively recent innovations in U.S. law, and
commercial rights to both are strictly limited in other nations. Part II
discusses the chilling effect of unfettered enforcement power, as well
as the recent invalidation of several notorious gene patents, and the
Federal Circuit’s divided response. Then, noting that judicial invalidation of gene patents was short-lived, Part III discusses statutory
means of ameliorating problems caused by gene patents. In particular,
it discusses the SACGHS’ proposed exemption from infringement
liability for the use of patented sequences in research. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the AUTM’s response to the SACGHS’ proposed exemption.
Finding that the AUTM’s concerns are exaggerated and unfounded, it
queries whether the AUTM’s motivations in opposing the exemption
reflect a misunderstanding of its implications or an improper alignment with the biomedical industry.
I.

PATENTING GENE SEQUENCES: GRANTING
EXCLUSIVITY OVER INFORMATION AS OLD AS
TIME

A generation ago, the prevailing wisdom was that the best way to
assure full utilization of publicly-sponsored research results for the
public good was to make them freely available to the public. Today,
federal policy reflects the opposite assumption.6
Treating gene sequences as patentable subject matter is not a
foregone conclusion under the language of the Patent Act7 or the history of case law interpreting it. Additionally, because the isolation of
5
As afforded by the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–204 (2011). See
infra Part I.B.
6
Rebecca Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools and the Law, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS & THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN
MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY
6,
7-8
(1997),
available
at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=5758&page=6.
7
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2011).
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gene segments generally occurs in university laboratories, the dispute
surrounding gene patents extends to the social utility of privatizing
publicly funded research. This part briefly reviews the rationale behind the patentability of gene sequences, noting that criticisms of this
rationale are ample and the state of the law is tenuous, as a recent
court ruling illustrates. It then turns to the source of gene discoveries—academic research—to discuss why the patentability of publicly
funded discoveries is itself unique and controversial.
A.

Gene Sequences as Patentable Subject Matter

The discovery of gene sequences is a relatively new phenomenon
in biomedical research; the first gene patent was issued in 1982.8
Thus, judicial interpretation of the Patent Act as it applies to genetic
information is relatively recent, and increasingly controversial. Recognizing gene sequences as patentable subject matter over which
owners have unfettered enforcement power has allowed patent owners
to halt publicly funded research as well as diagnostic care, creating
substantial frustration among patients, clinicians, and scientists, and
leading to a recent unprecedented judicial limitation of these intellectual property rights.9
Patented gene sequences stretch the boundaries of intellectual
property law because they provide exclusivity over “the most basic
information,”10 rather than over “product[s] of human ingenuity.”11
However, patentees argue that because a gene patent claims an isolated form of DNA, the resulting property right is tied to a sequence
that is not naturally occurring (e.g., requires human intervention and is
thus patentable subject matter).12 Indeed, the Supreme Court has been
clear that the bounds of patentable subject matter are to be construed
8

Gene Patents and Global Competition Issues: Protection of Biotechnology
Under Patent Law, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Jan. 1, 2006),
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/gene-patents-and-global-competitionissues/1163/.
9
See infra Part II.C.
10
Stiglitz & Sulston, supra note 1, at A19.
11
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
12
Patentable subject matter includes “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit’s conclusion that genes are chemical compounds, and thus not products of nature when isolated from other DNA, was critical
to finding that gene sequences were patentable subject matter. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A gene is a chemical compound.”); see also Roger D. Klein, Gene Patents and Genetic Testing in the United
States, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 989, 989 (2007) (chronicling the patentability of
genetic material).
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broadly, so as to encourage economically productive efforts.13 Thus
far, the U.S. Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) has treated isolated
sequences as such, granting patents so long as they have not yet been
claimed,14 are not obvious to one skilled in the “art” of genetics,15 and
can be described in detail.16
Nonetheless, the patentability of gene sequences is both controversial and potentially fragile. The United States is unique in granting
gene patent holders unlimited enforcement power; nearly every other
high-income nation has tempered a gene patentee’s ability to constrain
research or clinical care.17 The unfettered approach taken by the
United States has created a multitude of problems, both in genetic
research and patient care.18 In response, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York recently invalidated seven broad patents claiming the composition and diagnostic use of two genes related
to breast and ovarian cancers.19 Although the Court accepted the
powerful arguments put forth by patient, clinician, and research advo13
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
14
A discovery must be novel to the relevant art in order for a patent to issue.
35 U.S.C. § 102.
15
A discovery must be non-obvious “to a person having ordinary skill in the
art,” in order for a patent to issue. 35 U.S.C. § 103. This requirement may be of
growing importance to the Federal Circuit. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379–82
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority erred in using utility, rather than non-obviousness, to invalidate a patent on expressed sequence tags).
16
A discovery must be described in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art … to make and use the same,” in order for a
patent to issue. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The utility of a gene—its function as a proteinencoding piece of information—must also be disclosed in a claim. Fisher, 421 F.3d at
1379 (holding that a gene sequence is not patentable subject matter if its utility is not
yet known).
17
The majority of high-income nations prohibit patents on medical processes
and diagnostics. Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. §
287(c), 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 308 (2008) (describing prohibitions on medical process patents); Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner ‘Process’ Infringer: Greasing the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 70 (1999) (noting that diagnostics are not patentable in most
other nations). Moreover, most limit the strength of patents by explicitly providing
for the use of compulsory licensing to promote public health. SACGHS Report,
supra note 4, at 81-87; see also JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE HASENZAHL,
UNCTAD—ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., NON-VOLUNTARY
LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK
UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA, 12
(2003) (noting that the United States’ lack of statutory authority to issue compulsory
licenses is unusual).
18
See infra Part II.
19
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see infra Part II.C.
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cacy groups, the Federal Circuit reversed many of them (and the parties continue to appeal), reflecting the volatility of gene patenting.20
B.

Basic Research as Patentable Subject Matter

The patentability of gene sequencing is unique not only because
of the naturally-occurring subject matter involved, but also because
the discoveries claimed in a gene patent generally stem from publicly
funded university research. The right to privatize products of publicly
funded research is well established—and indeed predates the patentability of genetic material—but is just as controversial as gene patenting itself. This section turns to the law that affords universities
ownership over the fruits of federally-funded work. While the validity of university-owned patents is not in question, the efficacy of this
legislation in stimulating drug development is, at best, uncertain.
All recent genetic research is based, at least in part, on the fifteen
billion dollar publicly funded Human Genome Project.21 Moreover,
the basic research involved in identifying a given gene’s potential
diagnostic or therapeutic value is conducted in large part by publicly
funded academic scientists.22 These researchers are able to patent this
work under the Bayh-Dole Act (Bayh-Dole), enacted in 1980 to grant
universities ownership over federally-funded discoveries.23 Seeking
to stimulate private investment in basic research, Bayh-Dole was intended to arm universities with exclusive rights over upstream developments that could be licensed to private industry for commercialization.24 Since then, universities have secured thousands of patents25
and entered into licensing contracts with the majority of the members
of the Biotechnology Industry Organization.26 Private industry has

20

See infra Part II; John Conley & Dan Vorhaus, Pigs Fly: Federal Court
Invalidates Myriad’s Patent Claims, GENOMICS L. REP. (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/03/30/pigs-fly-federal-courtinvalidates-myriads-patent-claims.
21
Nicholas Thompson, Gene Blues: Is the Patent Office Prepared to Deal
with the Genomic Revolution?, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 9, 14.
22
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 2 n.5 (noting that over half of basic
research funding came from the federal government in 2006).
23
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2011).
24
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 28; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); Klein, supra note 13, at 989.
25
Klein, supra note 13, at 989.
26
Letter from James C. Greenwood, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Biotechnology Industry Organization, et al., to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t
of
Health
&
Human
Serv’s
2
(Feb.
4,
2010),
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invested in the commercialization of over one hundred drugs, vaccines, and in vitro devices initially developed in university laboratories.27
Despite increased commercialization of basic research, it is not
clear that Bayh-Dole has increased utilization of publicly funded research. Not only does public funding account for a large portion of
“bench to bedside” developments (reducing the need for private investment in basic research),28 but Bayh-Dole itself has also complicated basic research in five ways that appear to slow, and sometimes
preclude, biomedical progress. First, patenting basic research has
created overlapping claims to gene segments. Researchers must navigate through a “patent thicket” before performing work on a gene
implicated by one or more claims.29 Second, unfettered licensing
freedom has resulted in universities exclusively licensing patented
gene sequences. This has created monopolistic authority over several
genes—which precludes research on, and testing for, gene mutations.30 Third, exclusively-licensed gene patents have prohibited other
university researchers from using basic nucleic acid sequences as research tools.31 Fourth, universities have allocated resources towards
expensive litigation to enforce their exclusively licensed patents.32
Finally, under Bayh-Dole, researchers face conflicting sets of incentives from the patent and academic publishing systems. Once encouraged to disclose findings immediately in a peer-reviewed journal, researchers who seek to patent their findings must refrain from publishhttp://essentialmedicine.org/sites/default/files/archive/SACGHSsign-onletter2-42010final_000.pdf.
27
Id.
28
Public funding of biomedical research increased by over 20 billion dollars
since the late 1970s, contributing to the increase in therapeutics and diagnostics
brought to market. Klein, supra note 13, at 989.
29
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 699.
30
The majority of diagnostic monopolies originate from university-owned
patents. Letter from Ethan Guillen, Executive Director, Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, and David Watkins, Coordinating Committee Member, Universities
Allied for Essential Medicines, to Arundeep Pradhan, President, AUTM 2 (Mar. 17,
2010),
http://essentialmedicine.org/sites/default/files/UAEM_AUTM_final%2020100317_0.
pdf.
31
See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 292–93 (2003) (noting
that the patent on primate embryonic stem cell lines includes exclusivity over all
human embryonic stem cell lines).
32
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216
(W.D.N.Y. 2003) aff’d, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting defendant’s motion
for summary judgment based on lack of written description and enablement after
university filed infringement action against pharmaceutical company).
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ing results until a claim is within a year of being filed with the
USPTO.33
There is substantial evidence that these five unexpected effects of
Bayh-Dole have hindered research, contrary to the spirit of the legislation.34 Indeed, Bayh-Dole provides that universities should license the
rights to their patents without “unduly encumbering future research
and discovery.”35 Yet Bayh-Dole provides little oversight authority to
ensure this occurs: the law does not restrict licensing agreements,36
and the National Institutes of Health has little authority to interfere
with a licensing agreement that appears to restrict access.37 In other
words, university patenting practices that encumber future research
violate the principles behind Bayh-Dole, but are neither expressly
prohibited nor actively deterred. Part II discusses the extent to which
gene patenting has, indeed, hindered research.
II.

THE EFFECT OF A GENE PATENT ON RESEARCH

[T]he scope of patents on DNA sequences evolved from patents on
gene-constructs encoding therapeutic proteins, to patents on DNA
sequences including not only their therapeutic utility in encoding the
protein, but also the application of the knowledge regarding a gene
sequence in diagnosis and research.38

33

Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, in 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECONOMY 1, 14 (Adam B. Jafee et.
al. eds., 2007).
34
See infra Part II.
35
35 U.S.C. § 200.
36
Federally-funded university research is not subject to the same licensing
restrictions as are research developments that come out of federal agencies. For example, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 prohibits licensing an invention
to private industry without public notice and a determination that the license will
neither substantially limit competition nor create an unreasonable period of exclusivity. SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 77-78.
37
For example, the National Institutes of Health may exercise “march-in
rights” and reclaim title to a patent if a patented invention is not being licensed in a
way which furthers the goals of Bayh-Dole. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32 at 294.
While march-in rights are not limited to being exercised under “exceptional circumstances,” the government will not own the patent until: (1) the Secretary of Commerce
approves the NIH’s determination that seizure is necessary to promote the objectives
of Bayh-Dole, and (2) the patentee has exhausted (and been unsuccessful in) an appeal of said determination. Id. at 293-94. These processes take years, and the NIH
has never “marched-in” to seize a patent. Id. at 294.
38
Birgit Verbeure, Gert Matthijs & Geertrui Van Overwalle, Analyzing DNA
Patents in Relation with Diagnostic Genetic Testing, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 26,
26 (2006).

HEALTH MATRIX

148

[Vol. 22: 139]

Claims on gene sequences not only stretch the boundaries of patentable subject matter, but also slow basic research. Patentees have
threatened potential or actual infringers with cease and desist letters,
leading researchers and laboratories to abandon projects relating to
patented genes. This section discusses how this activity, along with
the use of diagnostic monopolies to prohibit clinicians from offering
comprehensive testing services, has led to widespread frustration
amongst scientists, clinicians, and patient advocates. Indeed, gene
patents have hindered basic research so substantially that researchers
have fostered a culture of acceptable infringement. Finally, this section turns to the recent invalidation of seven gene patents, a clear judicial recognition that untempered enforcement power currently afforded to gene patentees is problematic at best.
A.

A Chilling Effect

Unfettered genetic research has the capacity to move quickly: the
American College of Medical Genetics attributes what are “usually
very rapid improvement[s]” to diagnostic tests to “the addition of new
mutations or the use of new techniques by numerous laboratories that
have accumulated samples from affected individuals over many
years.”39 Gene patents, however, limit this work, prohibiting all but a
few laboratories from collecting patient samples, identifying new mutations, and refining the accuracy and scope of a given test. In other
words, diagnostic monopolies not only hinder patient access,40 but
also preclude researchers from developing alternative or improved
versions of a test.41 Two characteristics of gene patents deter research: (1) the high transaction costs associated with licensing the
rights to a patented gene; and (2) the breadth of gene patents, which
often encompass both the gene itself and the method of searching for
unusual sequences.
39

Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics Exec. Comm., American College of Medical
Genetics Position Statement on Gene Patents and Accessibility of Gene Testing, 1
GENETICS
MEDICINE
237
(1999),
available
at
www.acmg.net/StaticContent/StaticPages/Gene_Patents.pdf [hereinafter ACMG
Position Statement].
40
Diagnostic monopolies hinder patient access when patentees do not accept
all forms of insurance coverage. For example, Myriad did not allow its laboratories to
accept Medicaid reimbursement, meaning that Medicaid beneficiaries could not access BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests without paying the 3,000 cost out-of-pocket. More
Harm than Good? Patenting Genes is Bad for Diagnosis, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2010,
at 90–91.
41
See Klein, supra note 13, at 990; More Harm than Good?, supra note 41,
at 91.
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Transaction Costs Associated with Licensing

Although researchers can theoretically license the right to conduct
research on a patented gene, the number of patents on various gene
sequences has made this a practical impossibility for many scientists.
Heller and Eisenberg have attributed the prohibitive transaction costs
involved in licensing negotiations to four factors.42 First, parties from
both public and private industry often have stakes in gene patents.
Negotiating agreeable terms is complicated by the divergent motivations of these parties. Second, researchers in the public sector have
limited bargaining power in negotiations with sophisticated private
firms. Third, predicting the future value of a gene sequence in a later
discovery is impossible, and each party is likely to overestimate its
own prospective contribution. Finally, researchers must navigate
through a “patent thicket” merely to find the patentee with whom to
begin licensing negotiations. Patent owners can then demand reachthrough license agreements on their sequences, guaranteeing them a
royalty on every development that stems from research on those
genes. A researcher seeking to use a gene segment on which multiple
parties have claims would then have to negotiate with multiple private
parties with varying commercial interests.43
2.

Broad Patent Claims

Gene patents are problematic for researchers because they are extremely broad: many claims cover all variations in a gene sequence,
and association patents claim all methods by which one could look for
new mutations.44 In other words, diagnostic patents preclude any
comparison of a patient’s DNA with a patented sequence.45 Such
broad patents on gene sequences have four implications for genetic
research. First, association patents slow data collection by precluding
unlicensed laboratories from testing patients for mutations of interest.
Second, these patents impede others from improving a diagnostic test
42

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 700.
Id.
44
See Verbeure et al., supra note 39, at 32.
45
Klein, supra note 13, at 990. For example, Myriad owns BRCA1 and
BRCA2, and the Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute owns the gene causing
aspartoacylase deficiency, or Canavan disease. See also Stiglitz & Sulston, supra
note 1, at A19 (“Myriad had total control over the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes since
the 1990s. No other companies have been able to do research on the genes without
Myriad’s permission.”); Verbeure et al., supra note 39, at 32; Gregory P. Lekovic,
Genetic Diagnosis and Intellectual Property Rights: A Proposal to Amend ‘The Physician Immunity Statute,’ 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 275, 288 (2004).
43
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or expanding its scope. Third, claims on gene fragments encumber
the development of multiplex testing and whole genome sequencing.
Finally, gene patents obstruct any research that might implicate a
claimed sequence, even as it relates to issues in which the patentee is
ostensibly uninterested.
Association patents detract from research by slowing data collection. Gene patents allow patent owners to shut down extant testing,
even that which was in place before the patentee filed its claim.46
Patentees have used cease and desist letters to demand that clinicians
either stop offering a diagnostic test or pay royalties for each test administered.47 For example, the owner of the Duchenne muscular dystrophy gene patent, Thermo Fisher Scientific, forced university medical centers to stop testing patients for the disorder.48 Athena Diagnostics, the exclusive licensee of the patented methods used to diagnose
Alzheimer’s disease, has prohibited other labs from offering the test.49
Even the possibility of infringement is sufficient to shut down a laboratory: in a survey of university diagnostic laboratories, the College of
American Pathologists found that 48 percent had stopped performing
or developing a diagnostic because of potential infringement liability.50
The second way in which gene sequence patents slow research is
by impeding others from expanding on or improving a diagnostic test.
Patentees cannot only stop unlicensed laboratories from using a patent-protected test, but also can block development of variations
thereon. This precludes researchers from using verification testing to
identify false positives or negatives in an extant test,51 as well as from
developing variants to test different sample types. For example, the
Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute not only used cease and
desist letters to prohibit laboratories from testing for the Canavan
gene, but also to stop any research relating to it, declaring that it

46

(2010).

47

Brendan Borrell, Lawsuit Rekindles Gene-Patent Debate, 436 NATURE 413

Amy Dockser Marcus, Licenses Drive Gene Debate, WALL ST. J., (Apr.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303348504575184103022053956.ht
ml.
48
Id.
49
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 21, 32, 41, 56.
50
Lekovic, supra note 46, at 291.
51
Talk of the Nation: Breast Cancer Gene Patents Challenged (NPR radio
broadcast
Dec.
11,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=121343433)
(interviewing Daniel Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent Foundation).
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would “enforce vigorously” its patents.52 Evidence of such impediments is not merely anecdotal: systematic review of the number of
academic publications relating to continued research on patented genetic sequences reveals that gene patents are strongly associated with
decreased follow-on research.53 Moreover, a survey of laboratory
researchers found that almost 50 percent have avoided test development out of fear of an infringement action, and 25 percent have abandoned an already developed test.54
Third, gene patents have slowed research by hindering the development of multiplex testing and whole-genome sequencing. Multiplex testing offers patients several diagnostic services at once, and
thus implicates a multitude of potentially patented sequences.55 Similarly, whole-genome sequencing will soon allow clinicians to examine
all of a patient’s genetic material, potentially looking for every identifiably harmful mutation in one sweep56—and implicating “hundreds
or thousands of patents already issued and exclusively licensed gene
by gene.”57 To develop either type of test without infringement, a
researcher must negotiate and agree to royalties on any number of
patented gene sequences. The resulting test might be more expensive
than the cumulative cost of each individual diagnostic.58 In other
words, gene patents may eliminate the efficiencies offered by multiplex or whole genome sequencing. The only alternative to such expensive negotiations is to conduct comprehensive testing at the risk of
facing an infringement suit. Emory University, for example, offers
“chromosomal microarrays,” tests that detect a number of chromoso52

Lekovic, supra note 45, at 292 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 30, Ex. A, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
53
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 2, 27 (citing Kenneth G. Huang &
Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193 (2009) (presenting
empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between patents and follow-on research
on a particular gene and concluding that patent ownership “fragmentation is … problematic for follow-on contributors to the public knowledge stream [and] … the negative effect of patents on follow-on public knowledge production is greatest for genes
closely linked to human disease”).
54
Thompson, supra note 22, at 14.
55
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 12; Andrew Pollack, After Patent on
Genes Is Rejected, Taking Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at B1.
56
Marcus, supra note 48.
57
Id. (quoting Robert Cook-Deegan, Director of the Center for Genome
Ethics, Law & Policy); see also More Harm than Good?, supra note 41, at 91
(“[G]ranting patents on individual genes … leads to ‘fragmented ownership of the
genome’ that will interfere with the progress of whole-genome sequencing.”).
58
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 51-52 (noting that anticipated “royalty
stacking” is likely to deter researchers from developing multiplex testing).
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mal abnormalities, many of which occur on patented genes.59 Some
of the results the University reports to patients directly implicate patents for which Emory has not negotiated licenses. 60 Thus, according
to the director of the medical-genetics department, “[e]verybody is a
little bit nervous because of the legal situation of whether or not what
we are doing would be viewed as infringement.”61 This approach is
precarious: any given patent holder could effectively shut down the
testing with an infringement action.62 Although the Supreme Court
has hinted that a court may refuse to grant injunctive relief to a “holdout” patentee who refused to agree to reasonable licensing terms,
there is no guarantee that an infringement challenge to a multiplex test
would be so resolved.63
Finally, gene patents obstruct research that potentially implicates
a claimed sequence, such as searching for a receptor site for a therapeutic or studying a rare disease associated with a patented fragment.
In other words, gene patents preclude all unlicensed research on
claimed segments, even those in which the patentee has no stake.

59

Marcus, supra note 48.
Id.
61
Id. (quoting David Ledbetter, Director of Emory University School of
Medicine medical-genetics department).
62
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 52.
63
The Supreme Court has hinted at—but not ruled on—the possibility that a
court could appropriately prohibit a “holdout” patentee from demanding unreasonable
royalties by refusing to grant said patentee injunctive relief from the defendant’s
infringement. The Court eliminated the Federal Circuit’s bright line rule requiring
injunctive relief upon showing of patent validity and infringement, but the intimation
that damages would be appropriate in a holdout appears in a concurring opinion only,
and is not sufficient to provide a multiplex test developer with assurance that a court
would protect its continued existence. See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 394 (2006) (“[T]he decision whether to grant of deny injunctive relief rests
within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and … such discretion must be
exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity. . . .”); see also id. at 396-97
(“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . When the
patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement
and an injunction may not serve the public interest. . . .”) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 52-53 (“[A] multiplex developer does not
learn until after lengthy and expensive litigation is concluded whether an injunction
will issue.”); Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially
Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037,
1043 (2008) (arguing that the eBay decision has minimal implications for the biomedical arena, because courts are always likely to grant injunctive relief where the
parties are competitors in the marketplace).
60
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Because gene sequences “open the door to future discoveries,”64 the
scope of this limitation is indefinite. For example, therapeutic research requires screening multiple gene fragments as potential receptor sites, or using several expressed sequence tags to identify the
genes that code for potentially therapeutic proteins.65 A researcher
who cannot negotiate the licenses to every patented segment or sequence tag must risk infringement, forgo testing patented receptor
sites, or abandon the research all together.66 Researchers are particularly likely to abstain from work on rare diseases that implicate patented sequences, as the cost of negotiating one or more licenses is
often greater than the expected returns on the resulting diagnostic test
or therapeutic.67 For example, the president of Gene Dx, a company
that develops diagnostics for rare genetic diseases, reports that he is
least likely to seek the rights to develop testing for a disease linked to
a patented gene.68 Finally, patent owners can use reach-through license agreements to abort a licensee’s research that it views as unprofitable.69 DuPont explicitly reserves this “veto power” in licensing
terms that govern basic research using its genetically engineered
mice.70
B.

A System of Rational Forbearance

The extent to which gene patenting interferes with basic research
is substantial. To be sure, genetic research is only unfettered if gene
sequences are widely licensed (e.g., the genetic sequence for cystic
fibrosis)71 or placed in the public domain (e.g., the genetic sequence
for Tay-Sachs).72 In contrast, where gene patents are exclusively licensed or not licensed at all, researchers and clinicians must—and
64
Rebecca Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the
Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 786–87 (2000).
65
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 699.
66
Id.
67
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 51.
68
Id. at 30 (“Gene patents have a severe negative impact on the development, and thus the availability, of genetic testing for rare disorders. . . . I can assure
the committee that any gene on which there is patent protection falls to the very bottom of my quite extensive list of genetic tests in which my company is interested.”).
69
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 699. A reach-through license
agreement allows the patent holder to demand royalties or exert control over future
discoveries made with the use of a patented gene sequence. Stephen G. Kunin, et al.,
Reach-Through Claims in the Age of Biotechnology, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 609, 618
(2002).
70
Id. at 699-700.
71
Marcus, supra note 48; SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 2.
72
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 21.

HEALTH MATRIX

154

[Vol. 22: 139]

do—knowingly infringe patents.73 Private industry rarely challenges
this behavior; indeed, further research often increases the value of a
patent at no cost to the patentee, and the use of cease and desist letters
against university researchers generally tarnishes a company’s reputation.74 Still, where industry is commercially threatened (e.g., by an
unlicensed laboratory offering a diagnostic test), it is quick to exercise
its enforcement power to preserve exclusivity over the uses of a gene
fragment. As discussed above, this has drastic consequences, both for
research and patient care. In other words, researchers cannot rely on
patentees exercising rational forbearance if their work may prove
commercially valuable down the line. The most infamous enforcement example has led to the groundbreaking litigation of several patents covering two genes: BRCA1 and BRCA2.
C.

Letting the “Gene Patent Horse Out of the Barn”75

Research and clinical care problems stemming from gene patenting have long been flagged as untenable. Recently, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York broke with precedent and invalidated two of the most notorious patents, striking down both composition and process claims76 on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.77
The Federal Circuit reversed this invalidation in part, issuing a split
decision reflective of the intensity of the controversy over gene patenting. This section reviews why these gene patents have stirred such
controversy, and how both the district court and Federal Circuit
treated them under the Patent Act. Because the decisions do not signal the end of gene patenting, the need for legislative remedies remains great.
Patents covering BRCA1 and BRCA2 have become infamous in
the gene patenting debate: mutations on these genes are associated
with increased risk for breast and ovarian cancers (60 and 15−40 per-

73

John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the
Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003).
74
Id.
75
Conley & Vorhaus, supra note 21.
76
Composition (or product) patent claims encompass rights to the gene sequence itself, while process patent claims encompass rights to the method of using the
sequence as a diagnostic tool. See e.g., USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE: CHAPTER 2100 PATENTABILITY 2100-9 (8th ed. rev. 2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep_e8r6_2100.pdf.
77
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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cent, respectively),78 and early detection has substantial implications
for prognosis and care.79 The University of Utah Research Foundation owns seven broad patents on these genes, covering all sequence
variations and diagnostic methods used on them.80 Myriad Genetics,
the exclusive licensee of these rights (and an offshoot of Utah’s Center of Excellence Program),81 has actively used cease and desist letters
to shut down any competing laboratory offering BRCA1 or BRCA2
screening, even those offering a test that Myriad does not perform.82
As a result, verification testing is not available and research focused
on improving the tests has been eliminated (even though Myriad’s
version of the test has a twelve percent error rate).83 Moreover, only a
limited range of sample types may be tested,84 and Myriad does not
accept all insurance plans and has not been able to secure coverage by
Medicaid in 50 percent of states.85 Thus, many patients have not been
able to access the tests, despite recommendations from their genetic
counselors.86 The breadth of these patents, and the problems they
created, formed the ideal basis for a legal challenge to the validity of
gene patenting itself, a USPTO practice that the medical profession
has contested for years.87

78
BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER
INST. 2 http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/Fs3_62.pdf (last reviewed
May 29, 2009).
79
More Harm than Good?, supra note 41, at 90; see also Borrell, supra note
47 (noting that BRCA mutations account for the majority of cases of inherited breast
cancer).
80
Borrell, supra note 47.
81
Myriad was established to commercialize research conducted at the University of Utah and has a close relationship with the institution. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., UNIV. OF UTAH TECH. VENTURE DEV. (Nov 18, 2005),
http://www.techventures.utah.edu/Documents/OtherCommercializationStories/Myria
d.pdf.
82
Id.
83
Id.; Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2,
CHEK2, and TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 JAMA 1379, 1386
(2006).
84
Borrell, supra note 47.
85
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
86
Id.
87
The American Medical Association, the American College of Medical
Genetics, and the College of American Pathologists each assert that broad gene patents run afoul of section 101. See Sherizaan Minwalla, A Modest Proposal to Amend
the Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) to Allow Health Care Providers to Examine Their
Patients’ DNA, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 471, 500–01 (2002) (quoting ACMG Position
Statement, supra note 39). In 2007, a House bill proposed to expressly prohibit gene
patenting. Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).
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In Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office88 (Myriad I), the District Court for the Southern District
of New York invalidated both the composition and process patents
covering the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, reasoning that genes are
products of nature and thus beyond the scope of patentable subject
matter.89 The analysis behind this decision is notably different from
other case law: the Myriad I Court rejected the premise that genetic
material is a chemical that, when isolated, is “markedly different”
from a gene existing in nature.90 Rather, the Court concluded that
gene sequences are strings of the same information—whether in vivo
or vitro.91 On appeal, the dissenting judge on the Federal Circuit
agreed, for the most part, with the district court’s reasoning, but the
majority of the three judge panel did not, resulting in a reversal of
most of the district court’s holdings. Notwithstanding the ultimate
outcome of the case, which remains to be seen,92 the palpable tension
between varying judicial interpretations of the patentability of genes
reflects the malleability of patent law as it applies to the biopharmaceutical industry. Thus, analysis of both courts’ treatment of the validity of Myriad’s composition and process patents warrants analysis.
The district court narrowed the focus of analysis for the patentability of gene segments to § 101 of the Patent Act, whereas prior
scrutiny had incorporated the novelty and non-obviousness requirements of §§ 102 and 103, respectively.93 In other words, no court had
explicitly held that patents on gene segments meet the threshold re-

88

See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
Id.
90
The defendants argued that an isolated gene is different from a naturally
occurring gene because it is “substantially separated from other cellular components
which naturally accompany a native human sequence [such as] human genome sequences and proteins.” Id. at 216 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Patent No.
5,693,473 col.19 1.6-15 (filed June 7, 1995)). The Court rejected this argument,
finding that the “purification of a product of nature, without more, cannot transform it
into patentable subject matter. Rather, the purified product must possess ‘markedly
different characteristics’ in order to satisfy the requirements.” Id. at 227 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)).
91
Id. at 232; Pollack, supra note 56.
92
Both parties have filed petitions for a rehearing by the three judge panel.
Defendant-Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing at 11, Myriad II, 2011 WL
3211513 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 5057015 at *11; Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing at 1, Myriad II, 2011 WL 3211513 (Fed.
Cir. July 29, 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 5057016 at *1.
93
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1991). The Federal Circuit has also examined gene patents under § 101, but has
narrowed in on the utility element of that section. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
89
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quirements of § 101 itself,94 which the district court concluded do
not.95 The Federal Circuit, in a 3-2 decision, both agreed and disagreed. The majority adopted Myriad’s arguments,96 concluding that
the act of cleaving DNA from its native source met the requirements
of § 101, seemingly relying on the utility of the isolated genes in finding that the same nucleotide sequences could be “markedly different”
from native DNA (e.g., pointing to protein synthesis and transgenic
animals as fruits of manmade labor).97 Although writing for the majority, Judge Lourie stood alone in this conclusion. Neither Judge
Moore nor Judge Bryson, concurring and dissenting, respectively,
adopted his reasoning that gene segments are patent eligible under §
101. Indeed, both declared Myriad’s patent on DNA segments of
fifteen or more nucleotides are not patent eligible, being distinct from
native DNA in neither features nor utility.98 Nonetheless, Judge
Moore concurred in the opinion merely to preserve the property right
expectations of patent holders.99 In his dissent, Judge Bryson appropriately chided such reasoning, noting that there is no “collective right
of adverse possession to intellectual property, and [the court] should
not create such a right.”100 Indeed, Bryson harshly criticized the majority, noting that it improperly defers to the USPTO’s Utility Exami-

94

The Federal Circuit has not decided whether isolated DNA is an unpatentable product of nature under § 101 alone, although one judge has at least questioned the idea. Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
95
The Myriad I court concluded that DNA strands are “unpatentable products of nature” because the “defining characteristic of DNA” (information coding) is
the same in both native and isolated forms. It went so far as to describe Myriad’s
contention that isolated DNA is “markedly different” from native DNA as a mere
“lawyer’s trick.” Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 185, 229.
96
Amici analogized the Myriad case to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309-10 (1980) (holding that a man-made micro-organism is patentable subject
matter because it is “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use’
and distinguishing the subject matter from un-patentable bacterium in part because of
its ‘potential for significant utility.’”) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609,
615 (1886)). See Brief for Rosetta Genomics, Ltd., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 (2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL
4853324, at *21-22; Brief for Univ. of New Hampshire School of Law as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 (2011) (No.
2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853318, at *10.
97
Myriad II, No. 2010-1406, 2011 WL 3211513, at *17 (Fed. Cir. July 29,
2011).
98
Id. at *21 (Moore, J., concurring); Id. at *38-40 (Bryson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
99
Id. at *32 (Moore, J., concurring).
100
Id. at *45 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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nation Guidelines (stating that isolated DNA is patentable subject
matter),101 and mocking the reasoning behind the court’s ruling:
[T]o argue that the isolated BRCA gene is patentable
because in its native environment it is part of a much
larger structure is no more persuasive than arguing that
although an atom may not be patentable, a subatomic
particle is patentable because it was previously part of
a larger structure, or that while a tree is not patentable,
a limb of the tree becomes a patentable invention when
it is removed from the tree.102
The district court’s invalidation of the BRCA gene patents is significant, along with Judge Bryson’s dissent to the Federal Circuit’s
reversal, even if both amount to no more than short-lived judicial acknowledgement of the substantial problems posed by gene patents.
Contrary to the rampant disagreement regarding Myriad’s composition patents, both the district court and Federal Circuit invalidated its
process patents as unpatentable abstract mental processes103 under the
Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation test.”104 If the Supreme
Court hears the case, it will have to determine whether the Federal
Circuit was correct to rely on this test, or whether it should have created a new (presumably more lenient) test as the Court recently insinuated would be appropriate in the context of “advanced diagnostic
medicine techniques.”105 Unless the Court rules otherwise, however,
judicial agreement in this context suggests stability with regard to the
patent eligibility of diagnostic mental processes.
Regardless of the final outcome of litigation pertaining to gene
patents, the research barriers associated with extant patents will persist. Thus, legislative solutions to these problems are critical. Part III
101

Id. at *44-45; see also USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed.
Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
102
Myriad II, 2011 WL 3211513, at *41 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
103
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 185 (“[B]ecause the claimed comparisons
of DNA sequences are abstract mental processes, they also constitute unpatentable
subject matter.”).
104
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954-55 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that “the sole
test” for determining whether a claimed process is patent-eligible under § 101 hinges
on whether “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing.”).
105
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). Since this ruling, the
Federal Circuit has not had the opportunity to elaborate on process patent tests except
in the context of graphic design. See Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft
Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 867-68 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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examines two existing policies that have successfully addressed related issues, as well as a new proposal recently promulgated by the
SACGHS.
III.

A RESEARCH EXEMPTION: ALLOWING SCIENTISTS
TO USE THE GENETIC INFORMATION BEFORE
THEM
Every scientific advance is built on those that came before it.106

The Myriad decisions reflect discontent with the limitations gene
patents place on basic research and clinical care. Ameliorating these
problems, however, does not necessarily require the elimination of
gene patents. Indeed, since the Federal Circuit ruled that a patentee’s
enforcement power extends beyond commercial use of a patented
process or product,107 Congress has statutorily prohibited certain patentees from using threats of infringement liability to dampen research
or clinical care. This section briefly describes those statutory exemptions from liability. It then turns to the SACGHS proposal, which
would similarly limit a patentee’s authority to slow basic research but
would not alter the patentability of gene sequences. This proposed
exemption is in line with existing laws—both in the United States and
elsewhere—that are designed to promote rather than deter innovation,108 and is ideal for universities seeking to conduct basic research
and contract with private industry.
A.

Existing Limitations on Patent Enforcement Power

Congress has created exemptions from liability for two classes of
researchers and clinicians, limiting the extent to which exclusivity
over a product or process can slow innovation or patient care.
106
Stiglitz & Sulston, supra note 1, at A19 (Stiglitz, the 2001 Nobel Prize
winner in economics, and Sulston, the 2002 Nobel Prize winner in medicine, both
supported the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation in
their suit against Myriad Genetics and the University of Utah Research Foundation).
107
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed Cir. 2002) (ruling that
the “experimental use” common law defense to an infringement action is limited to
actions performed for “amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry,” and does not include basic research) (quoting Embrex Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed Cir. 2000)).
108
REICHMAN, supra note 17, at 5-6, 11-12; Robert M. Portman, Legislative
Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to
Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 92 (1996).
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First, Congress has prohibited patent owners from seeking relief
for infringement that occurs in preparation for seeking regulatory approval of a drug or medical device from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).109 This allows researchers to develop generic drugs
during a pioneer drug’s patent term, so that generics are ready for
market immediately upon expiration of the pioneer patent.110 Because
laboratory diagnostics are not subject to FDA regulations, diagnostic
research is not similarly protected from infringement liability.111
A second exemption shields medical providers from liability for
infringement that occurs as the result of performing a medical or surgical procedure.112 This exemption is narrow: it does not protect a
provider from infringement liability for the use of a patented product
or biotechnology process during the course of such a procedure.
Therefore, a clinician is still not exempt from liability for performing
a patented diagnostic test,113 although many have proposed such an
extension.114
Neither of these narrowly tailored exemptions has deterred innovation, as opponents predicted each would. Instead, these exemptions
have served to ameliorate problems associated with patent exclusivity,
and serve as a model as legislators attempt to mitigate similar logjams
stemming from gene patenting.
B.

109

A Proposed Research Exemption

The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act) exempts research done in preparation for submission to the
FDA from infringement liability. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2011) (“It shall not be an act
of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import
into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”).
110
See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056,
1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the abbreviated route by which Hatch-Waxman
allows generics to come to market).
111
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 12, 61.
112
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2011).
113
Id. §§ 287(c)(2)-(c)(3).
114
A bill was introduced into the House in 2001, but failed to become law.
See Genomic Research & Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th
Congress (2002). The National Research Council and College of American Pathologists have advocated for such an exemption. SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 97;
Gene
Patents,
COLL.
A M.
PATHOLOGISTS
(Aug.
31,
2004),
http://web.archive.org/web/20041024182035/http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/advocacy
/advocacy_issues/genes_patents.htm (accessed by searching for the original URL on
Internet Archive) [hereinafter CAP Gene Patents]; Minwalla, supra note 88, at 500;
Lekovic, supra note 46, at 296.
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After analyzing the effect of gene patenting on genetic research,
diagnostic quality, and clinical access, the SACGHS advised the Secretary of Health and Human Services to support, among other
things,115 the legislative creation of an “exemption from patent infringement liability for those who use patent-protected genes in the
pursuit of research.”116 The SACGHS identified this exemption as a
potential solution to several of the barriers that gene patents create for
research. This exemption not only opens the doors to unfettered basic
research, but also is limited in scope; like the existing exemptions, it
does not threaten the incentives patents provide for private investment
in biomedical discoveries. Finally, the proposed exemption offers a
very mild approach—when compared with the Myriad alternative—to
the problems created by gene patents. From a university standpoint,
the SACGHS’ proposed research exemption offers the best of two
worlds: patented material is shared amongst researchers as if in the
public domain, but new discoveries may still be privatized for commercialization.
The SACGHS recommended an exemption from liability for infringement of gene patents conducted in the course of research as a
tenable solution to several of the barriers it identified. For example,
patent owners would no longer be able to prevent unlicensed laboratories from offering diagnostic tests.117 Thus, competing laboratories
could offer verification testing, creating a check on testing quality,
and a patentee without a diagnostic could not strip the market of the
availability of any test at all.118 Moreover, patent owners would not
be able to “sit on” an extant diagnostic, as the licensee of the gene
patents related to congenital long QT syndrome did for two years.119
Finally, researchers would not have to navigate patent thickets to license the right to perform further research on the diagnostic or therapeutic potential of a patented gene sequence. The American Medical
Association, the American College of Medical Genetics, and the Col-

115

The SACGHS also recommended that the Secretary support an exemption
from liability for all work pertaining to diagnostic tests used for patient care, promote
adherence to non-exclusive licensing guidelines, increase transparency surrounding
licensing agreements, establish an advisory board on gene patenting and health, provide advice to the Patent and Trade Office, and promote equal access to diagnostics.
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 1-4.
116
Id. at 4, 97.
117
Klein, supra note 13, at 989.
118
SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 83.
119
Id. at 3-4.
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lege of American Pathologists have long advocated for a research
exemption to promote progress in diagnostics.120
While the proposed research exemption would open the doors to
unfettered basic research on gene segments, it would not further limit
the enforcement power behind a gene patent. Thus, for discoveries
with potential commercial applications—such as therapeutics—
universities could continue to attract private investment in the commercialization of a patented gene. Basic research on these genes,
however, would continue without restraint. To the extent that this
research produces an end product, incentive for private investment is
not necessary.
Finally, the proposed research exemption is a very minor adaptation to the strength of a gene patent, particularly in light of the Myriad
I alternative. Indeed, some argue that a research exemption for the
infringement of gene patents is tantamount to the disclosure requirement imposed on all patent claims.121 Because gene sequences are
nothing more than units of information, allowing unfettered use is
arguably the only way to ensure that a gene patent does not fail the
disclosure requirement by impermissibly “restrict[ing] the public from
perceiving and analyzing information about the invention.”122 From a
university standpoint, the SACGHS’ proposed research exemption
offers an ideal balance: academic researchers would have unrestrained
use of genetic material, while technology transfer offices would retain
the ability to seek patents on the products of their research. Part IV
examines the AUTM’s opposition to the proposed research exemption, and queries whether this resistance is misguided or reflective of
profit-driven motives.
IV.

UNIVERSITY
OPPOSITION:
MAINTAINING
RESEARCH
EXCLUSIVITY
OVER
GENETIC
INFORMATION

AUTM has sided with industry to take a position that will harm
the interests of university researchers, not to mention the patients who
need these genetic tests.123
120
Minwalla, supra note 88, at 501; ACMG Position Statement, supra note
40; CAP Gene Patents, supra note 116.
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Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 796–97.
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Id. at 797.
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Press Release, Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, UAEM Calls
on AUTM to Retract Opposition to Panel Recommendations to Improve Access and
Innovation
in
Field
of
Genetic
Testing
(Mar.
17,
2010),
http://essentialmedicine.org/story/2010/03/17/uaem-calls-autm-retract-oppositionpanel-recommendations-improve-access-and-innovat [hereinafter UAEM].
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The AUTM, along with several industry groups, has voiced strong
opposition to each of the SACGHS’ proposals to improve research on,
and access to, diagnostics. The AUTM’s resistance to any of the recommendations is worthy of analysis, but its hostility towards the research exemption is particularly striking, given the association’s primary focus on “managing and licensing innovations derived from
academic and nonprofit research.”124 This section argues that the
AUTM’s concerns with the proposed research exemption are exaggerated and unfounded, as the exemption would promote, rather than
hinder, university research. After laying out the role of the AUTM,
this section describes the Association’s opposition to the SACGHS’
proposed research exemption. It then argues that the AUTM’s claims
have little basis in reality and raise a red flag: either the AUTM misunderstands the purpose of Bayh-Dole, or it has adopted a misguided
interest in securing rent-seeking licenses based on the fruits of academic researchers.
The AUTM is a network of academic technology transfer managers who seek to “[f]acilitate the commercialization of research [results] for the public good . . . [and]. . . [g]enerate [university] income
and promote economic growth.”125 The organization takes substantial
strides to exert its influence: although it denies lobbying, it actively
“educates and communicates with public officials” on any subject
related to university intellectual property rights (IPRs).126 Facilitating
unhindered research is a fundamental component of the AUTM’s mission,127 and it has twice confirmed its commitment to promoting ac124
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TECH.
MANAGERS,
http://www.autm.net/About/2185.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
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Id.
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See generally Letter from the Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n et al., to John
Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Nancy Pelosi, Democratic
Leader
of
the
House
of
Representatives
(June
13,
2011),
http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform%20PDFS/Mass%20Industry.pdf
(expressing AUTM’s support for a proposed legislative provision that would allow
the USPTO to retain all user fees); see generally Brief for Ass’n of Am. Univ. et. al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1159),
2010 WL 5385333, at *4 (arguing that Bayh-Dole prohibits a researcher from licensing a university’s rights to an invention to a third party); Gene Patents and Other
Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 73 (2000) (prepared
statement of James A. Severson, President, Cornell Research Foundation on Behalf of
the AUTM).
127
One of the AUTM’s “[c]ore [v]alues” is that its work “benefits the public.”
Mission and Goals, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS (July 22, 2009),
http://www.autm.net/Mission_and_Goals/4253.htm.
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cess to basic research. In 2007, the AUTM signed In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology, a
policy statement that asserts that researchers should not be subjected
to infringement liability.128 Two years later, the AUTM drafted a
Statement of Principles and Strategies for the Equitable Dissemination of Medical Technologies, asserting that intellectual property
rights must not be used as a barrier to the dissemination of universitydeveloped research.129
One day before the SACGHS released its Draft Report on Gene
Patents and Licensing Practices, the AUTM—along with twenty-five
members of the biopharmaceutical industry—sent a letter of “grave
concerns” to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.130 The
letter strongly criticized the forthcoming SACGHS’ recommendations
and predicted that their implementation would “seriously hamper public/private collaborations and the commercialization of publiclyfunded research,” and “chill future investment and innovation.”131
The AUTM explicitly disapproved of the proposed research exemption, alleging that it would undermine “the value of gene-based patents.”132 It also attacked the merits of the SACGHS’ findings, alleging that the report is “based on claims of a crisis . . . that does not exist.”133 It warned that “the recommendations, if implemented, would
unravel . . . the patent system and the Bayh-Dole Act” and “do more
harm to patients than good, by impairing the research, development
and commercialization of the medicines and diagnostic tests of tomorrow.”134
The AUTM’s opposition to the SACGHS’ proposed research exemption is unfounded and overstated: the proposed research exemption neither inhibits diagnostic progress nor removes the incentive for
private investment in basic research. First, the exemption would al128

Letter from Ethan Guillen & David Watkins to Arundeep Pradhan, supra
note 31, at 2.
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3.
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low university researchers to develop diagnostic tests without licensing with private industry. This is fully consistent with Bayh-Dole,
enacted to attract private investment in basic research only where further commercialization is necessary to bring a development to market.135 Because diagnostic tests are “often ready for use straight out of
the lab . . . they do not require the patent ‘carrot’ to attract investment.”136 Indeed, diagnostics are often entirely publicly funded and
widely available long before a gene patentee develops a similar test.137
Moreover, academic researchers who develop diagnostics report being
motivated not by potential patents, but rather by the prestige, reputation, and career advancement that attach to break-through discoveries.138 Players in the biomedical industry agree: the patentability of a
future diagnostic serves as a “very minor motivational role, at best.”139
Second, where further commercialization is necessary to bring a development to market, biomedical firms will continue to invest to develop therapeutics out of basic research, as the proposed exemption
does not alter the patentability of genetic discoveries.
Indeed, the AUTM’s opposition to the proposed research exemption is alarming because the exemption offers universities the optimal
arrangement. Arming academic researchers with unrestrained use of
gene segments would heighten productivity—leading to increased
output of diagnostics and potential therapeutics—and would not hinder a university’s ability to seek a patent and use it as a negotiating
tool in the commercialization of basic research. Thus, the AUTM’s
resistance to the SACGHS’ proposal appears to be motivated by one
of two rationales. First, the AUTM may be misconstruing Bayh-Dole
to promote private investment even where basic research is sufficient
to produce an end product. This would be a blatant misconception:
the law was unequivocally designed to encourage commercialization
135
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UAEM, supra note 125.
137
For example, tests for spinocerebellar ataxia, breast cancer, Canavan disease, familial long QT syndrome, and hearing loss were available before the eventual
patentee of the related gene developed its own test. SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at
31; see also More Harm than Good?, supra note 41, at 91; Stiglitz & Sulston, supra
note 1, at A19.
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SACGHS Report, supra note 4, at 21 (quoting Katie Skeehan et al., Impact of Gene
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of basic research only where necessary to take a discovery from
“bench to bedside.”140 Second, if the AUTM has not misinterpreted
Bayh-Dole, its position may reflect an imprudent alignment with private industry. This is alarming and a cause for concern. The AUTM
cannot simultaneously cater to the conflicting objectives of for-profit
and nonprofit institutions. Indeed, its alliance with industry in resisting a research exemption that would benefit academic researchers
reflects that it may have already placed the former over the latter.
CONCLUSION
Gene patenting is steeped in controversy, largely because of the
many complications it creates for scientists, clinicians, and patients.
The stifling effect on basic research is one of the biggest problems
stemming from current gene patenting practices: unchecked enforcement power behind a patent has allowed patentees to shut down any
and all research relating to a claimed segment of DNA. This phenomenon, along with barriers to clinical care, has stirred great debate
over the merits of gene patenting and how the strength of such patents
might be tempered.
The recent partial invalidation, of two notorious gene patents—
BRCA1 and BRCA2—is an unprecedented judicial response to the
problems posed by gene patenting. Moreover, the differential reasoning and conclusions of each of the three judge appellate panel reflects
flux and uncertainty regarding the validity of gene patents as a group.
If nothing else, the disagreement within the Federal Circuit on the
matter reflects the complexity of the problems in this area.
Regardless of the ultimate validity of gene patents, legislative solutions offer effective and modest modifications to the strength of
gene patent that can ameliorate some of the problems associated with
them. One such solution is the SACGHS’ recent proposal for an exemption from liability for infringement that occurs during the course
of basic genetic research. This exemption would allow academic researchers unlimited use of all DNA sequences, but would not alter the
patentability of related discoveries. Thus, it would increase the efficiency of basic research without detracting from a university’s ability
to seek a patent and license the rights to a discovery that requires further commercialization.
Surprisingly, the AUTM opposes such an exemption. The AUTM
alleges that the exemption would slow research by reducing the incentive for private firms to invest in upstream discoveries. On the con140
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trary, the exemption would not affect collaboration with private industry: where an academic discovery requires further commercialization,
biomedical companies would continue to enter into licensing agreements with universities. Further, the exemption would open the doors
to research relating to any gene segment, thus accelerating basic research.
The AUTM’s motivations in opposing the proposed research exemption are suspect and appear to be based in either a misunderstanding of the purpose behind Bayh-Dole or an improper alignment with
industry goals. Either is alarming, and would have negative implications for the management of the licensing of university innovations.

